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We test for the populist view of state capture in Latin America be-
tween 1970 and 2003. The empirical results￿ based on the relatively
novel panel time-series data and analysis￿ con￿rm the prediction that
recently-elected governments coming into power after periods of po-
litical dictatorship, and which are faced with high economic inequal-
ity and demand for redistribution, end up pursuing unfunded populist
[re]distributive policies. These policies, in turn, lead to bursts of hyper-
in￿ ation and therefore macroeconomic instability in the region. All in
all, we suggest that the implementation of democracy as such requires
not only the ￿ right political context￿ ￿ or a constrained executive￿ to
work well, but it also must come with certain economic institutions,
(e.g. central bank independence and a credible and responsible ￿scal
authority), institutions which would raise the costs of pursuing populist
policies in the ￿rst place.
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11 Introduction and Motivation
Latin America has been known for its high economic inequality, and also
for a particular propensity to ￿ irt between political dictatorships and more
democratic institutions. For instance, in the 1980s, after a spell of dicta-
torships, a number of Latin American countries re-democratised, (e.g. Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, to mention a few). However, immediately
after this process of political liberalisation, or a reduction in political polari-
sation, had taken place, high in￿ ation and even bursts of hyperin￿ ation also
happened in those countries. Macroeconomic stabilisation took some time
to take root. In fact, stabilisation came only after a considerable ten-year
delay in the 1990s.
Given that, this paper uses data from Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bo-
livia from 1970 to 2003, and the sample captures periods of high political
polarisation, re-democratisation, high in￿ ation, hyperin￿ ation, and then ￿-
nally macroeconomic stabilisation. We therefore test for the populist view of
state capture in Latin America, which predicts that in countries with high
economic inequality that re-democratise, the coalition coming into power
will try to [re]distribute income from the rich to the poor. However, this
is usually done through higher and unfunded public de￿cits, which in turn
generate higher in￿ ation, and this is known to be detrimental to the welfare
of the poor1.
The empirical results suggest that political polarisation presents a neg-
ative and signi￿cant impact on in￿ ation, which indicates that the reduction
in polarisation seen in the 1980s was, in fact, detrimental to macroeconomic
stability. Therefore, the evidence allows us to speculate that the recently-
elected governments in those countries pursued populist, or the so-called
[re]distributive, policies that eventually led to poor macroeconomic perfor-
mance in the role of very high rates of in￿ ation and even hyperin￿ ation.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is that, ￿rstly, we fo-
cus on those Latin American countries which presented hyperin￿ ationary
bursts right after re-democratisation, which further disaggregates the data
1For instance, Bittencourt (2009) investigates the case of the Brazilian hyperin￿ ation
of the 1980s and 1990s, and he suggests that the high rates of in￿ ation seen at the time
were regressive on inequality. Moreover, Easterly and Fischer (2001) suggest that the poor
from 38 countries consider in￿ ation to be a more pressing problem than the rich, which
illustrates that the poor are the ones su⁄ering more with higher in￿ ation.
2and therefore pinpoints more accurately the impact of reduced political po-
larisation on in￿ ation. Secondly, we construct a political index based on
principal components analysis, which extracts the common factors of dif-
ferent political variables, and that gives a proxy for political polarisation
with more explanatory power. Thirdly, we make use of the relatively novel
panel time-series analysis that deals with interesting empirical issues such as
non-stationarity, heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels and between-country
dependence, issues not covered by the previous studies, and which is there-
fore believed to improve on previous estimates.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: the next Subsection brie￿ y
reviews and inserts this paper within the previous literature. Section 2
describes the data and the empirical strategy used, and then reports and
discusses the results. Section 3 concludes; it summarises the work, and
suggests some policy implications and also future work.
1.1 Related Literature
Paldam (1987) presents some early evidence, which does not take into ac-
count the hyperin￿ ationary bursts of the 1990s, that suggests that civilian
governments tend to generate higher in￿ ation than military ones in Latin
America; and Sachs (1989), and Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) descrip-
tively highlight the issue of recently-elected governments pursuing populist
policies in Latin America.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that in more polarised societies sta-
bilisations are delayed, (i.e. stabilisations come only after some ￿ political
consolidation￿takes place, or after an agreement on which group pays for
the stabilisation is reached). This is important for the Latin American case
because, roughly speaking, stabilisation came only after a ten-year delay
following the implementation of democracy. Alternatively, Cukierman et al.
(1992) suggest that more homogeneous societies rely less on seigniorage, and
Veiga (2000) provides evidence that in more fragmented, or societies with
a large number of political parties in congress, stabilisations are delayed.
Moreover, Beetsma and Van der Ploeg (1996) argue that in excessively un-
equal societies, and Latin America ￿ts the bill again, the government tries
to please the medium voter, or the poor in this case, via redistribution2.
2In addition, Al-Marhubi (1997), suggests that higher inequality is positively associated
with higher in￿ ation rates in a cross-section of countries.
3Desai, et al. (2003) suggest that it all depends on how unequal a country
is, (i.e. democratisation taking place in unequal countries lead to populist
policies and hence high in￿ ation, which is the case in some Latin American
countries). Furthermore, Desai et al. (2005), suggest that inequality a⁄ects
in￿ ation, but conditional on the political structure3.
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) suggest that dis-
tortionary macroeconomic policies that retard economic growth, (e.g. in
terms of high in￿ ation), are symptoms of ￿ weak institutions￿ , or not prop-
erly constrained executives. Furthermore, Acemoglu, Johnson and Querub￿n
(2008) suggest that policy reforms are only successful when the ￿ political
context￿is right, (e.g. Zimbabwe implemented central bank independence
in 1995, however it has been plagued with hyperin￿ ation since 1999 when
the constraints on the executive were severely curtailed). Finally, Dutt and
Mitra (2008) suggest that excessive inequality leads to political instability,
which in turn leads to policy volatility, and therefore lower investment and
growth.
All in all, the literature suggests that the implementation of democracy
in developing countries should be accompanied not only by the ￿ right polit-
ical context￿ , or well-constrained executives, but also by the right economic
institutions, (e.g. sound ￿scal and monetary policies conducted by a respon-
sible and independent treasury and central bank respectively). All the same,
the ￿ right political context￿and the right economic institutions should move
together in this context, so that the costs of delayed stabilisations could
be somehow avoided. This seems to be the case in Latin America, (i.e.
a re-democratisation process without much political maturity, or ￿ political
consolidation￿ , and also without the necessary economic institutions in place,
resulted in a long spell of macroeconomic instability in the region, with all
its costs)4.
2 Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
The data set used covers the period between 1970 and 2003, and four Latin
American countries, namely Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, (i.e. T =
3Also, Aisen and Veiga (2006) suggest that political instability, exempli￿ed by the
number of government crisis, leads to higher in￿ ation, in particular in developing countries.
4Alternatively, Crowe (2006) suggests that when democratisation takes place, the ￿ elite
bias￿is reduced and macroeconomic stabilisation takes place without much delay.
434 and N = 4). The data on in￿ ation (INFLAT) come from the Bureaux of
Census of the four countries. The political variables that we use come from
the Polity IV data set, which is compiled and provided by the Centre for
Global Policy, and they are: democracy (DEMOC), which ranges from 0 (a
less democratic country) to 10 (a more democratic one); constraints on the
executive (XCONST), which ranges from 1 (a less constrained executive) to
7 (a more constrained one); and (POLCOMP), which ranges from 1 (less
political competition) to 10 (more political competition).
With the above information we can then use principal components analy-
sis to extract the common factors, or the linear combinations, of these three
normalised Polity IV variables, so that we end up with a proxy for political
polarisation (POLITY ) with more explanatory power. This is potentially
important because in this case we are able to reduce the dimensionality of
a set of prospective political variables, and we end up with one variable,
POLITY , that contains most of the information coming from di⁄erent can-
didates for political polarisation.
The control variables used include the government￿ s share of the real
gross domestic product (GOV), the ratio of exports and imports over the
real gross domestic product (OPEN) and the growth rate of the real gross
domestic product (GROWTH), which are all provided by the Penn World
Table (PWT) data set mark 6.2.
Table One presents the correlation matrix so that we can have an initial
insight on the behaviour of the data; and what can be initially seen is that
both measures of polarisation used, (i.e. XCONST and POLITY ) present
negative and statistically signi￿cant correlations with in￿ ation. This ten-
tatively suggests that when polarisation decreased, or when these countries
re-democratised in the 1980s, macroeconomic performance deteriorated in
terms of in￿ ation rates.
The control GOV presents the expected positive correlation with in￿ a-
tion, (i.e. bigger governments tend to generate higher in￿ ation), and OPEN
and GROWTH present the expected negative signs against the in￿ ation
rates. This is because it is believed that more economically open societies
and countries that grow faster tend to present a more stable macroeconomic
environment.
5Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, 1970-2003.
INFLAT GOV XCONST POLITY OPEN GROWTH
INFLAT 1
GOV .0932 1
XCONST -.2074* .0773 1
POLITY -.1886* .0404 .9851* 1
OPEN -.0722 -.2121* -.2472* -.2214* 1
GROWTH -.2657* .0889 .2088* .1656 .0053 1
Sources: Bureaux of Census, Centre for Global Policy, Penn World Table, and author￿ s
own calculations. * represent statistical signi￿cance at the 5% level.
In addition, and for the sake of clarity, we plot the Brazilian data, which
somehow mirror the other countries in the sample, so that we can have a
more in-depth initial view of the behaviour of the data at the time. The ￿rst
panel of Figure One illustrates the behaviour of in￿ ation and the share of
government in the gross domestic product, and what can be seen is that both
variables moved together at the time of the hyperin￿ ationary bursts. In the
second panel we put together in￿ ation and POLITY , and it illustrates the
fact that when Brazil re-democratised in 1985 the in￿ ation rates increased
considerably.
The third panel illustrates the sharp increase in GOV that took place
after the re-democratisation of 1995. Finally, we plot the simple OLS regres-
sion line between in￿ ation and POLITY , and the relationship is negative,
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Figure 1: In￿ ation and Political Polarisation, Brazil 1970-2003. Sources: Brazilian Bu-
reau of Census, Centre for Global Policy, Penn World Table, and author￿ s own calculations.
POLITY is the measure of political polarisation, INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates, and
GOV is the government￿ s share of the real gross domestic product.
Therefore, this initial inspection of the data, with all its caveats, sug-
gests that the process of political liberalisation taking place in the 1980s
was followed by very high rates of in￿ ation in the region. Moreover, sta-
bilisation was clearly delayed in the Brazilian case, (i.e. it came only in
1994, or ten years after the ￿rst civilian President came into o¢ ce, with the
implementation of the Real Plan).
Moving forward, since we have a T > N data set, the empirical strategy
used is based on panel time-series analysis. Firstly, for non-stationarity in
the country time-series we use the Im, Pesaran and Shin [IPS (2003)] test,
which allows for heterogeneous parameters and serial correlation. The IPS
test consists of an augmented Dickey-Fuller regression for each country of
each variable, which are then averaged. The moments of the mean and
variance of the average ￿ t are -1.43 and .62 respectively5.
5An alternative to IPS (2003) is the test by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). However, this
7Secondly, the issue of heterogeneity bias in dynamic T > N panels￿
caused for under mistakenly assumed homogeneity of the slopes the com-
posite disturbance term is serially correlated and the explanatory variables
xs are not independent of the lagged variable yt￿1￿ is dealt with by the
Swamy￿ s (1970) Random Coe¢ cients (RC) estimator, which gives consistent
estimates of the expected values. The RC estimator assumes the existence
of heterogenous intercepts and slopes, and it consists of a weighted aver-
age of ￿i and of the ￿is and the weight is a modi￿ed variance-covariance
matrix of the heterogeneous parameters6. Moreover, the one-way Fixed Ef-
fects (FE) estimator also provides consistent estimates in dynamic models
when T ! 1, but only when the slopes are homogeneous7. All in all, these
estimators account for the fact that some of these countries present di⁄er-
ent levels of economic development because of particular idiosyncrasies, (i.e.
Brazil and Argentina are known to be relatively more developed than Peru
and Bolivia).
We therefore estimate static and dynamic models with di⁄erent pooled
estimators, (i.e. the benchmark Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS),
Fixed E⁄ects (FE) and Random Coe¢ cients (RC)). The estimated hetero-
geneous dynamic equation is therefore as follows,
INFLATit = ￿i + ￿iPOLITYit + ￿iGOVit + ￿iOPENit (1)
+￿iGROWTHit + "iINFLATit￿1 + ￿it;
in which INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, POLITY are the common factors
of DEMOC, XCONST and POLCOMP, GOV is the share of government
in the gross domestic product, OPEN is a measure of economic openness
and GROWTH are the growth rates of the gross domestic products.
In addition, we deal with between-country dependence, which is believed
to happen through the disturbances being E(uitujt) 6= 0. For that we make
use of Zellner￿ s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator,
test assumes parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible hetero-
geneity bias present in the data.
6The Mean Group estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), is also an alter-
native. However, this estimator is sensitive to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC
estimator.
7In addition, GMM-type estimators are not an alternative under T > N for the over-
￿tting problem. See Bond (2002).
8which presents greater e¢ ciency, the greater the correlation amongst the
disturbances. The SUR estimates di⁄erent country time series, which are
then weighted by the covariance matrix of the disturbances8. Moreover, this
estimator provides rather insightful estimates because it disaggregates the
analysis even further than the pooled analysis9. Equation Two illustrates
the equation estimated for each country,
INFLATt = ￿t + ￿POLITYt + ￿GOVt + ￿OPENt (2)
+￿GROWTHt + ￿t:
In terms of results, ￿rstly, in Table Two we report the IPS statistics and
they suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots and accept
in favour of the alternative that at least one country of each variable is,
in fact, stationary. This implies that no further data transformations are
needed, and also that the variables are not cointegrated.








The moments of the mean E and variance var of the average ﬂ t are respectively: -1.43
and .62. Source: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and author￿ s own calculations.
Secondly, in Table Three we report the static estimates of XCONST
and POLITY on in￿ ation using the POLS and FE estimators respectively.
Columns One and Two make use of the XCONST variable and it presents
a negative and statistically signi￿cant impact on in￿ ation in both estimated
8An alternative to SUR is the Common E⁄ects Estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006).
However, N is assumed to be large and in our data set N=4. Furthemore, Kapoor, M.,
H. H. Kelejian, et al. (2007) propose an estimator that also works best under the N ! 1
assumption.
9For a more thorough discussion about panel time-series analysis in general, see Smith
and Fuertes (2008).
9equations. The control variables present the expected signs and are all
statistically signi￿cant, (i.e. GOV is positively associated with in￿ ation,
and OPEN and GROWTH are negatively associated with the in￿ ation
rates). The F test* suggests the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects, which indicates
that the FE estimator is the most appropriate one in this static instance.
Columns Three and Four make use of the POLITY proxy for political
polarisation, and this proxy also presents negative and statistically signif-
icant e⁄ects on in￿ ation in both equations. The control variables follow
the same pattern as before, (i.e. GOV has a positive impact on in￿ ation,
and OPEN and GROWTH present negative e⁄ects on the in￿ ation rates).
The F test* con￿rms the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects, which again makes the
FE estimator the most appropriate to be used in this context.
Table 3: Static Estimates of XCONST and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2003.
Static Models
INFLAT POLS (1) FE (2) POLS (3) FE (4)
GOV .1136 (3.26) .1236 (2.05) .1115 (3.16) .1199 (1.97)
XCONST -1.5262 (-2.72) -2.44 (-5.03)
POLITY -.1576 (-1.94) -.3477 (-4.84)
OPEN -.0886 (-7.50) -.2373 (-9.46) -.0859 (-7.21) -.2449 (-9.45)
GROWTH -.1560 (-5.42) -.1060 (-4.28) -.1631 (-5.64) -.1096 (-4.42)
Constant 4.50 (4.98) 8.33 (5.02) 3.61 (4.35) 7.19 (4.48)
F test 28.96 50.44 27.32 49.36
F test* 19.88 20.74
R2 .46 .39 .44 .37
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 136: The basic esti-
mated equation is INFLATit = ￿ + ￿POLITYit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit +
￿GROWTHit +￿it; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates, POLITY is the po-
litical polarisation proxy, GOV is the government￿ s share in the real GDP, OPEN is
a measure of economic openness, and GROWTH is the growth rates of the real GDP.
POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares and FE is the Fixed E⁄ects estimators.
Thirdly, in Table Four we report the dynamic estimates of XCONST
and POLITY on in￿ ation using the FE and RC estimators respectively.
In Columns One and Two we use the variable XCONST, and it presents
negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation. The control GOV
10presents the expected positive sign, however it is not entirely signi￿cant
this time. The other two controls, (i.e. OPEN and GROWTH), present
the expected negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation, and are statistically signi￿cant.
Although the F test* suggests the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects, the Likelihood
Ratio (LR) test suggests heterogeneity of intercepts and slopes, which indi-
cates that the RC estimator is the one delivering the best estimates in this
dynamic case.
In Columns Three and Four we make use of the POLITY proxy for
political polarisation, and it presents negative and statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ects on in￿ ation in both equations. As before, the control GOV presents
the expected positive sign, however it is not statistically signi￿cant. OPEN
and GROWTH present the expected negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation, and are,
just as before, statistically signi￿cant. The F test* indicates the presence
of ￿xed e⁄ects, nevertheless, the LR test again suggests the presence of
heterogeneous intercepts and slopes, which makes the RC estimator the
best alternative in this context.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that in all these dynamic equations,
GOV loses statistical signi￿cance, which further highlights the importance
of political polarisation as the main determinant of in￿ ation in the region
at the time.
11Table 4: Dynamic Estimates of XCONST and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2003.
Dynamic Models
INFLAT FE (1) RC (2) FE (3) RC (4)
GOV .0709 (1.60) .0085 (.09) .0698 (1.57) .0152 (.17)
XCONST -.7473 (-1.95) -1.04 (-2.16)
POLITY -.0960 (-1.71) -.1426 (-1.93)
OPEN -.1159 (-5.47) -.1130 (-4.03) -.1159 (-5.29) -.1146 (-3.88)
GROWTH -.0819 (-4.44) -.0829 (-3.29) -.0835 (-4.53) -.0845 (-3.40)
INFLAT(￿1) .5846 (10.82) .5613 (6.11) .5905 (10.92) .5630 (6.21)
Constant 3.36 (2.63) 4.41 (1.94) 2.93 (2.41) 3.72 (1.66)
F test 101.28 100.37
F test* 8.39 7.97
Wald test 211.28 209.73
LR test 46.21 46.48
R2 .68 .68
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 136: The basic esti-
mated equation is INFLATit = ￿i + ￿POLITYit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit +
￿GROWTHit + "INFLATit￿1 + ￿it; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates,
POLITY is the political polarisation proxy, GOV is the government￿ s share in the real
GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, and GROWTH is the growth rates
of the real GDP. FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and RC the Random Coe¢ cients estimators.
Finally, when we disaggregate the analysis further and make use of the
SUR estimator that takes into account any between-country dependence
present in the data, the story the data are telling does not change much. In
the ￿rst panel of Table Five the XCONST variable presents negative signs
and most of the estimates are statistically signi￿cant. Brazil is the country
with the largest estimate of all, and Argentina, perhaps for being the least
unequal country in the sample, does not present entirely signi￿cant esti-
mates. Furthermore, the control variables present the expected signs, (i.e.
GOV keeps its positive impact on in￿ ation, and OPEN and GROWTH
their negative e⁄ects, and most of the estimates are also statistically signi￿-
cant). The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of independence suggests that we
can not accept the null hypothesis of between-countries [in]dependence.
When we use POLITY as the proxy for political polarisation in the
second panel of Table Five, all estimates present the by now expected neg-
12ative e⁄ects on in￿ ation, and most of the estimates are also statistically
signi￿cant, with Argentina being the only exception again. Moreover, most
controls present the expected signs as above and are statistically signi￿cant.
The LM test indicates that we can not accept the null of between-countries
independence, which also justi￿es the use of the SUR estimator in this in-
stance.
Table 5: SUR Estimates of XCONST and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2003
SUR
INFLAT BRAZIL ARGENTINA PERU BOLIVIA
GOV .1367 (1.74) 1.12 (3.72) -.1970 (-1.68) .2443 (1.42)
XCONST -4.11 (-3.65) -1.16 (-1.22) -2.52 (-3.72) -2.19 (-2.38)
OPEN -.2401 (-4.33) -.3997 (-8.42) -.2609 (-7.38) -.1383 (-2.06)
GROWTH -.0626 (-1.26) -.0842 (-2.20) -.1039 (-3.85) -.0723 (-.66)
LM test 2.97
GOV .1435 (1.85) 1.16 (3.87) -.1899 (-1.63) .2632 (1.52)
POLITY -.5583 (-3.69) -.1522 (-1.09) -.3457 (-3.84) -.3709 (-2.42)
OPEN -.2367 (-4.36) -.4080 (-8.22) -.2740 (-7.76) -.1368 (-2.06)
GROWTH -.0701 (-1.42) -.0861 (-2.25) -.1018 (-3.80) -.0751 (-.70)
LM test 2.94
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 136: The basic estimated
equation is INFLATt = ￿t+￿POLITYt+￿GOVt+￿OPENt+￿GROWTHt+
￿t; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates, POLITY is the political polarisation
proxy, GOV is the government￿ s share in the real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic
openness, and GROWTH is the growth rates of the real GDP. SUR is the Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions estimator.
All in all, the estimates reported above indicate that the process of re-
democratisation of the Latin American countries in this sample was followed
by high rates of in￿ ation, and even bursts of hyperin￿ ation. Loosely speak-
ing, the reduction in political polarisation, or the introduction of more de-
mocratic institutions, seen at the time was somewhat detrimental to macro-
economic stability, at least in terms of in￿ ation rates. Alternatively, it can
be said that unequal and repressed societies that implement more demo-
cratic institutions must make sure that the executive is well constrained,
and also introduce sound economic institutions such as a responsible ￿scal
13authority and an independent central bank, so that hyperin￿ ations do not
occur and stabilisations, when needed, are not delayed.
3 Concluding Remarks
We investigated in this paper the role of more democratic institutions on
in￿ ation in a panel of Latin American countries that re-democratised in the
1980s. The results, based on the relatively novel panel time-series analysis,
suggest that those countries su⁄ered from high rates of in￿ ation and even
bursts of hyperin￿ ation right after they re-democratised. Moreover, macro-
economic stabilisations came only after a long and protracted delay. All
in all, the populist view of state capture, which predicts that newly-elected
coalitions coming into power in repressed societies end up generating higher
de￿cits and, in turn, higher in￿ ation, is accepted by the data and analysis
conducted here.
The current relevance of carrying out a historical study on the Latin
American hyperin￿ ationary experience is that, as we speak, an emerging
country like Zimbabwe is su⁄ering from hyperin￿ ation. On the one hand, it
can be speculated that the Zimbabwean hyperin￿ ation which started only
in 1999, coincides with the fact that the constraints on the governing party
were relaxed, and at the same time a new and more representative oppo-
sition party was created. On the other hand, the present analysis can also
be related to the South African case, a repressed society indeed, but with
a rather strong constitution which constraints the executive, and without
much political competition or opposition to the governing party since the de-
mocratisation of 1994. In this respect the South African government, which
has never bowed to populist demands for [re]distribution coming from a
weak opposition, has been quite e¢ cient in managing the economy.
Furthermore, the quality of the evidence presented is, to a certain extent,
boosted not only because we focus on those rather unequal countries which
re-democratised and su⁄ered from hyperin￿ ation in Latin America, but also
because we use a novel proxy for political polarisation based on principal
components analysis, which is believed to be a step forward since it has more
explanatory power. Moreover, we make use of the novel panel time-series
analysis, which deals with important empirical issues not covered by the
previous studies such as heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels and between-
14country dependence. It is therefore believed that the analysis conducted here
represents a step forward in terms of achieving better and more insightful
estimates.
Regarding future work, on the one hand, the inclusion of inequality would
be a welcome development to this analysis, however data on inequality from
Peru and Bolivia are very fragmented, which somehow precludes a study
on the impact of political polarisation and inequality on in￿ ation. More
realistically, the use of an alternative proxy for ￿ political consolidation￿ , (e.g.
the number of political parties in congress since re-democratisation) would
be a feasible alternative to Polity IV variables.
On the other hand, this sort of analysis would be applicable to the Zim-
babwean case, (i.e. the impact of the reduction on the constraints on the
executive and the hyperin￿ ationary episode that followed since 1999 should
be further analysed). Moreover, the current South African context is of some
interest, since a new political party with some opposition power has been
recently created, and which can demand from the government some sort of
[re]distribution.
To conclude, the Latin American hyperin￿ ationary experience is insight-
ful because it exempli￿es an interesting pattern, (i.e. repressed societies that
re-democratise and which still do not have the ￿ right political context￿or ef-
￿cient constraints on the executive, nor the right economic institutions such
as an independent central bank conducting sound monetary policy and a
credible ￿scal authority in place, will end up doing more harm than good in
terms of macroeconomic [in]stability, which a⁄ects mainly the welfare of the
poor). Moreover, those Latin American countries took, roughly speaking,
ten years to stabilise, which is also an example of a delayed stabilisation.
Macroeconomic stabilisation came only when those countries matured their
political constraints on their executives, and also when they introduced cen-
tral bank independence, in￿ ation targeting and ￿scal responsibility laws in
the 1990s10.
All in all, political liberalisation should be accompanied by some sort of
￿ political consolidation￿and also by the implementation of the right economic
10For instance, Singh (2006), Singh and Cerisola (2006) and Santiso (2006) highlight the
importance of the much improved macroeconomic performance in Latin America recently
to produce better economic outcomes from the 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, Carstens and
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